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Abstract 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) projects often lead to disappointing outcomes, even 
downright failures, which is not in keeping with the vast investments they require.  It is argued in 
this paper that a lack of managerial focus on the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for ERP 
implementation at the outset of their project (however well captured they have been in the 
literature to date) is the root cause of organisations not achieving the expected outcomes from 
their Transformation investment. This paper examines the ERP project implementations of four 
organisations where data and observations were collected over a two year period. From this rich 
body of empirical evidence, we propose to contribute to our collective understanding of the CSFs 
for ERP implementation that play a key role in ensuring that investments in ERP packages 
(Transformation investments) have a greater likelihood of producing desired project outcomes. 
This research paper also contributes to increasing the perceived usefulness of CSFs to managers 
and practitioners and illustrates the fact that organisations should undertake self-assessment 
exercises to improve their preparations for ERP project implementations.         
Keywords: Transformation Investments, ERP projects, CSFs, Case Studies, Theory Building 
Résumé 
Les Investissements en Progiciels de Gestion Intégrés (PGI) ont souvent des résultats mitigés, voire désastreux. Cet 
article montre que le manque d’attention des manageurs aux facteurs de succès spécifiques de ce type de projets 
explique en grande partie pourquoi les entreprises n’obtiennent pas les effets transformationnels recherchés. Sur la 
base de quatre études de cas, nous proposons une théorie qui explique les relations entre les facteurs de succès 
identifiés et les résultats des projets PGI. 
Introduction 
ERP packages are positioned as one of the most sought after means of organisational transformation and IT 
innovation since the mid 1990s and form the cornerstone of IS for an ever increasing percentage of organisations 
(Holland & Light, 2001; Swanson & Ramiller, 2004; Sharif et al., 2005; El Amrani et al., 2006).  Investing in an 
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ERP package has been characterised as a Transformation investment (Ross & Beath, 2002), which requires 
managers to understand the importance of changes to the business in order to achieve the expected benefits from the 
project (Murphy & Simon, 2002; Ross & Beath, 2002).  Paradoxically, while investments in ERP packages are 
amongst the most significant an organisation will ever have to engage in; the realities of ERP implementation are 
not fully understood by managers (Olsen & Saetre, 2007) and the benefits expected at the outset of the project are 
not always a realistic feature of actual project outcomes (Chen, 2001; James & Wolf, 2000; Murphy & Simon, 2002; 
Shang & Seddon, 2002; Law & Ngai, 2007).  All too often organisations fail to prepare appropriately for an ERP 
project implementation, which has been referred to as mindlessness by Swanson & Ramiller (2004), and as a result 
invest in what is essentially an IT initiative as opposed to a business change project (Wood & Caldas, 2001; Murphy 
& Simon, 2002; Ross & Beath, 2002).  It is argued in this paper that a lack of managerial focus on the CSFs for ERP 
implementation at the outset of a project is the root cause of organisations not achieving their expected benefits from 
their ERP-based Transformation investments.             
The objective of this research is to identify the CSFs for ERP implementation that can be used by managerial 
decision-makers to improve the likelihood that their ERP-based Transformation investments produce outcomes in-
line with organisational expectations.  To meet this objective four cases of ERP implementation are studied.  A 
series of CSFs for ERP implementation are analysed across the cases to provide an insight into the presence or 
absence of these CSFs at the outset of the project and the impact on project outcomes.  The remainder of this paper 
is structured as follows.  The next section presents ERP projects as Transformation investments followed by an 
analysis of the CSFs for ERP implementation.  Following this, the research method followed in our study is then 
presented followed by a presentation of the findings of the research in the four organisations studied.  Finally, we 
propose a CSF-based recipe to achieve Transformation investment outcomes in the case of ERP projects and the 
conclusions and implications of the research are discussed. 
Theoretical Grounding 
It is extremely difficult to estimate all the costs and to assess all the benefits, in particular intangibles (Murphy and 
Simon, 2002; Sumner, 2005), at the outset of an ERP project (Stefanou, 2000; Teltumbde, 2000).  This assessment 
exercise is often referred to as making the ‘business case’ for the project implementation (Sumner, 2005).  Thus, an 
alternative means of assessment to making this ‘business case’ is needed in order to provide managerial decision-
makers with the ability to evaluate their preparations for their ERP implementation at the outset of the project in 
order to ensure that the outcomes expected from the project investment can be achieved; therefore, moving away 
from a pure costs and benefits mindset.  As a result, this paper focuses on analysing the presence or absence of CSFs 
for ERP implementation as an alternative means of assessment.    
ERP as Transformation Investments 
Although there is no agreed upon definition for ERP systems, they are characterised as integrated, all-encompassing, 
complex mega-packages designed to support the key functional areas of an organisation (Gable et al., 1997; Markus 
and Tanis, 2000).  It is this all-encompassing nature and high degree of business integration which distinguishes 
ERP packages from other technologies or systems (El Amrani et al., 2006; Law & Ngai, 2007) and leads us to 
consider ERP project investments as inherently different in terms of difficulty and success factors.   
An ERP project is essentially a business change project as opposed to an IT initiative and can be classified as a 
Transformation investment (Ross & Beath, 2002).  A Transformation investment is perceived as a strategic decision 
as opposed to a cost justified business decision and “transformational investments are necessary when an 
organisation’s core infrastructure limits its ability to develop applications critical to long-term success” (Ross & 
Beath, 2002 p.53).  However, what is critical to understand is that this infrastructure must be aligned with the 
requirements and directions of the organisation’s changing business model, therefore, ensuring that the long-term 
vision of top managers is supported by the implemented ERP system. As a result, for an ERP investment to be 
considered a true Transformation investment and to achieve the expected benefits, the importance of changes to the 
business processes supporting the business model needs to be fully understood from the outset (Murphy & Simon, 
2002; Ross & Beath, 2002; Law & Ngai, 2007) along with the realisation that payoffs are not easily or quickly 
achieved (Ross & Beath, 2002; Gargeya & Brady, 2005).  Furthermore, “transformation investments demand 
significant senior management commitment to invest funds, guide implementation and process change, and steer the 
organisation toward opportunities to leverage the investments” (Ross & Beath, 2002; p.57).  These characterisations 
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of Transformation investments allow us to note that, based on the many reported cases of ERP implementations, 
investments in ERP projects are often unrealistic and lack credibility, in terms of what can be achieved in reality 
based on the means applied by the organisation, and what is actually expected from the initiative. Thus, it is 
necessary to establish what actions should be taken by managers to ensure that ERP investments turn out to be 
transformational in terms of their impact, so as to make sense of the low levels of satisfaction that are reported by 
organisations post ERP implementation (Law & Ngai, 2007).   
Prima facia, we can hypothesise that if managers and organisational personnel’s expectation of the extent of the 
change needed is lacking, then ‘desired’ Transformation investments may only produce outcomes characteristic of 
Renewal investments, which is simply an investment to replace existing systems without embracing cultural and 
procedural changes (Sammon & Adam, 2007).  According to Ross & Beath (2002, p.55) “renewal investments 
replace old shared technologies with newer, more powerful or more cost effective ones.  Renewal may foster process 
improvement, but that is not its primary objective”.  Therefore, this mismatch between the ambitious ‘desired’ goals 
and the means applied and the resulting ‘actual’ outcomes of an ERP investment will lead to underperforming 
implementations of ERP which don’t deliver value-for-money investments.  The value of Renewal initiatives does 
not depend on making business process changes and the initiatives are often the responsibility of IT.  As a result, if 
ERP projects are considered huge organisational undertakings (Transformation investments introducing business 
change), coupled with a potentially high risk of project failure, it should be imperative that proper evaluation be 
undertaken so that these projects don’t get treated as simple IT projects (Teltumbde, 2000; Murphy & Simon, 2002).   
Evaluating ERP Investments 
Over the past fifteen years, ‘a tidal wave of IT-enabled initiatives’ has elevated the importance of investing 
strategically in IT (Ross & Beath, 2002).  Numerous reports have highlighted that ERP projects have occupied a 
dominant space in IT investment throughout this period, however paradoxically; researchers have noted a 
deteriorating trend of evaluation of these investments (Stefanou, 2000; Teltumbde, 2000; Chen, 2001; Murphy & 
Simon, 2002; Ross & Beath, 2002; Sumner, 2000; 2005).  In fact, ERP investments are often made on faith and not 
on good judgment; this observation is further corroborated by many studies, both in relation to ERP and the broader 
IS community (Hochstrasser & Griffiths, 1991; Willcocks, 1992; 1996; Ballantine et al., 1996; Wagle, 1998; 
Bannister & Remenyi, 2000; Swanson & Ramiller, 2004).  This is not a new argument in the IS field, where the 
evaluation of IT investments in general is regarded as unsatisfactory (Strassmann, 1997) or patchy (Willcocks & 
Lester, 1997).  The predominant reason for this state of evaluation of IT investments is that organisations find it very 
difficult to perform such evaluations (Wilson, 1991; Ballantine et al., 1996; Changchit et al., 1998; Ward & 
Peppard, 2002; Murphy & Simon, 2002), which it can be argued, is related to the lack of suitable investment 
appraisal methodologies for this type of strategic investment (Counihan et al., 2002).   
Analysing the discourse of participants within the ERP Community, notably vendors and consultants, but also 
managers who look towards ERP as the solution to all their problems, all too often reveals unrealistic and 
unrealisable expectations being placed on ERP packages (Sammon & Adam, 2002; Law & Ngai, 2007).  
Implementing organisations seem to display an acceptance of the ERP vendors’ and consultants’ sales discourse that 
is not in keeping with the most basic principles of prudence (Westrup & Knight, 2000).  Indeed, “the rhetoric of the 
packaged software vendors is particularly pervasive and has widespread appeal” (Howcroft & Light, 2006, p.217).  
Therefore, believing that the introduction of an ERP package will be the solution to all organisational problems can 
have detrimental consequences for the organisation (Kelly et al., 1999; Markus & Tanis, 2000; Stefanou, 2000; Van 
Stijn & Wensley, 2001; Shang & Seddon, 2002; Verville & Halingten, 2003; Gargeya & Brady, 2005; Keil & 
Tiwana, 2006; Olsen & Saetre, 2007).  This insight proves extremely worrying for organisations investing in ERP 
packages and calls into question the expectations of organisational decision-makers as to the ‘desired’ outcomes 
from investing in an ERP package versus the ‘actual’ outcomes and value-for-money from such an investment.  
However, scant reasoning and mindlessness are indeed common characteristics defining organisations’ approaches 
to investing in ERP packages (Milford & Stewart, 2000; Chen, 2001; Wood & Caldas, 2001; Swanson & Ramiller, 
2004) which indicates that the realities of ERP implementation are not fully understood by managers at the outset.  
As a result, examining the CSFs for ERP implementation may provide us with some insight into the factors that 
have received attention in the literature to date.      
Organization Theory, Strategy and IS 
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CSFs for ERP Implementation 
CSFs have been applied to many aspects of Information Systems (Butler & Fitzgerald, 1999) and are defined as 
“those few critical areas where things must go right for the business to flourish” (Rockart, 1979; p.85).  An 
abundance of research articles have been published over the past fifteen years documenting various CSFs for ERP 
project implementations (Holland et al., 1999; Holland & Light, 1999; Bingi et al., 1999; Sumner 1999; Parr et al., 
1999; Parr & Shanks, 2000; Chen, 2001; Esteves & Pastor, 2001; Nah et al., 2001; Somers & Nelson, 2001; 
Akkermans & van Helden, 2002; Hong & Kim, 2002; Al-Mashari et al., 2003; Brown and Vessey, 2003; Umble et 
al., 2003; Verville & Bernardas, 2005; King & Burgess, 2006; Finney & Corbett, 2007).  Table 1 provides a 
thorough synthesised representation of the CSFs for ERP implementation which have been discussed to date.  The 
CSF names used in Table 1 were chosen from the terminology frequently used in the literature to allow the reader to 
appreciate and easily identify the concepts these CSFs represent.  Therefore, Table 1 presents a macro-level naming 
of each of the eight CSFs we have synthesised from the literature reviewed, to embrace as exhaustive a set of CSFs 
as possible (without carrying the large number of different factor names presented; for instance in Finney and 
Corbett, 2007), while also reporting on when each factor is considered a success/failure as gleamed from the extant 
literature reviewed.      
  Table 1: A Synthesis of CSFs for ERP Implementation (adapted from the literature listed above) 
CSFs Factor is considered a Success when.. Factor is considered a Failure when.. 
Existence of Actual 
Strategic Business Need 
informing Specific Project 
Goals and Objectives 
The project mission is related to 
business needs and this is clearly stated 
Organisations fail to specify their 
organisational objectives 
Top Management 
Commitment and Support 
Top management monitors the progress 
of the project and provides the direction 
for the implementation 
High-level executives do not have a 
strong commitment to the project 
Prioritised Business 
Requirements and Required 
System Functionality 
Organisations translate business needs 
into prioritised activities and recognise 
the importance of streamlining business 
operations 
Organisational diversity is ignored or 
downplayed and idiosyncratic ways of 
doing business, which are most likely 
inefficient, are automated 
Allocation of Best Internal 
Business Personnel 
The internal business resources are 
dedicated full time to the project and 
understand the overall needs of the 
organisation and guide the project 
efforts in the right direction 
The most knowledgeable organisational 
personnel are not part of a cross-
functional project team and there is an 
overreliance on consultants, often 
resulting in limited knowledge transfer  
Effective Communication Top management communicate a 
shared vision of the organisation 
including the role of the new system 
and structures 
Internal communication channels are 
not open at all times and / or neglect 
certain categories of actors 
Definitive Project Scope 
 
 
The project scope is clearly defined, 
understood and controlled, including 
the number of modules implemented, 
the involvement of business units, and 
the amount of business process 
reengineering needed 
A lack of coordination leads to 
implementation delays and 
organisational conflicts, while 
piecemeal implementation neglects the 
very purpose of an integrated package 
Accurate Project Timeframe 
and Costing 
Comprehensive project planning is not 
taken lightly or with little forethought 
Organisations were unable to develop a 
comprehensive plan 
Required Organisational 
Buy-In and Project 
Ownership 
Cross-functional coordination exists 
ensuring appropriate involvement of all 
stakeholders 
 
If no agreement or collaboration on 
changes exists between managers then 
there will be no ‘enthusiasm’, ‘buy-in’ 
or there may even be active resistance 
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It can be argued that the volume of literature relating to the factors critical to an ERP project implementation falls 
short of providing organisational decision-makers with the necessary issues to address in an ERP project, and more 
importantly the methods through which these issues can be understood at the outset of the project.  In fact, while 
studies of CSFs for ERP implementations are well received in the academic community and provide lists of CSFs, 
they are “only a partial aid to the practitioner struggling to understand the implications of their actions”, while “the 
vast majority of the literature [on CSFs for ERP project implementations] focuses on ‘static’ CSFs, often for the 
development stage of the life-cycle, and generally not explicitly linked to outcomes” (King and Burgess, 2006 p.59; 
p.67).  Therefore, the impact of CSFs on achieving desired ERP project outcomes has yet to be established .  In fact, 
Lam (2005, P.176) commented that CSF studies are “valuable for making sense out of problems where there are 
many potential factors influencing the outcome, and where the researcher hopes to make a set of practical 
recommendations based on the most influential factors”. 
It is a surprising characteristic of ERP research that efforts have not been made to improve the significance of CSFs 
and their usefulness for ERP project implementations.  The majority of the ERP literature focusing on CSFs for ERP 
implementation presents ‘simplistic classification systems’ or ‘laundry lists’, while the theoretical development of 
the CSF concept remains embryonic (Somers & Nelson, 2001; Akkermans & van Helden, 2002; Lam, 2005; Finney 
& Corbett, 2007).  One notable omission from these research endeavors is an illustration of how these ‘simplistic 
classification systems’ are to be used in practice.  Indeed, as managers seem to make the same mistakes repeatedly 
when it comes to undertaking investments in ERP packages, it suggests that they either cannot or simply do not 
choose to use the recommendations documented in the academic literature. Therefore, it remains that these 
simplistic classifications of CSFs have not been applied in practice to any great extent, leaving the issue of 
improving understanding amongst decision-makers preparing to undertake an ERP project implementation 
unaddressed.  It has been argued that a more intimate understanding of CSFs by managerial decision-makers would 
ensure that these factors receive attention to guide an ERP implementation (Finney & Corbett, 2007).  Therefore, IS 
researchers need to contribute towards raising the usefulness and relevance of the CSF approach, in particular with 
regard to guiding ERP implementations so organisations achieve their Transformation investment project outcomes.   
Research Methodology 
The objective of this research was to identify the CSFs for ERP implementation that should specifically be used by 
managerial decision-makers to ensure that their Transformation investments (ERP projects) produce outcomes in-
line with organisational expectations.  Also, our aim was to consider complete ERP projects, that is to say, unlike 
Brown and Vessey (2003), to take a holistic view of ERP project outcomes and not only focus on the 
implementation phase. This is particularly important for three out of our four cases which required major follow-on 
investments, contributing to their excessive duration. In light of the lack of theoretical maturity around the CSFs for 
ERP implementation (Somers & Nelson, 2001; Akkermans & van Helden, 2002; Lam, 2005; Finney & Corbett, 
2007) and the level of organisational dissatisfaction with the outcomes of ERP projects (Stefanou, 2000; Teltumbde, 
2000; Chen, 2001; Murphy & Simon, 2002; Ross & Beath, 2002; Sumner, 2000; 2005) this exploratory research 
sought to build theory using case studies.  Building theories from case studies is deemed appropriate in situations 
where ‘little is known about a phenomenon’, or ‘current perspectives seem inadequate because they have little 
empirical substantiation’, or ‘they conflict with each other or common sense’ (Eisenhardt, 1989; p.548), simply 
because building theory from case studies does not rely on previous literature or prior empirical evidence (Gersick, 
1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Dooley, 2002).  As a result, “building theory from case study research is most appropriate 
in the early stages of research on a topic or to provide freshness in perspective to an already researched topic”, 
where “conflict in the process is likely to generate the kind of novel theory which is desirable when extant theory 
seems inadequate” (Eisenhardt, 1989; p.548).  Indeed, in the context of this research study, this ‘freshness in 
perspective’ is required on the topic despite the fact that it has received considerable attention throughout the past 
fifteen years.         
From the perspective of this research study, the following description of the appropriateness of a case study to a 
particular type of research seems accurate: “case research is particularly appropriate for certain types of problems: 
those in which research and theory are at their early, formative stages, and sticky, practice-based problems where the 
experiences of the actors are important and the context of action is critical” (Benbasat et al., 1987; p.369).  
However, the selection of cases, the sampling problem, is an important aspect of any type of research approach, 
especially when building theory from case studies.     
Organization Theory, Strategy and IS 
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Case Selection 
A ‘collective case study’ (Stake, 2000; p.437) research strategy was adopted for this study.  A collective case study 
is a multi-site qualitative research approach which is extended to several cases using a replication strategy.  In an 
effort to guide the case selection, the insights of Stake (2000) were drawn upon, where an instrumental study 
replicated in several cases was undertaken.  It is a fact that understanding a single intrinsic case would not in itself 
have fulfilled the objective of this study, however, jointly studying a number of instrumental cases better facilitated 
investigating the presence or absence of CSFs for ERP implementation, where the diverse organisational stories of 
those ‘living the case’ could be teased out (Stake, 2000).  In the context of this study, for an organisation to be 
considered suitable for inclusion it had to have undertaken an ERP project, and at the time of first contact with the 
organisation, be in the post-implementation phase, operating on an ERP platform for at least twelve months, for all 
or part of the project, depending on the implementation approach followed by the organisation.  We used a 
systematic purposeful sampling approach (Patton, 1990) for the selection of the research sites, where we considered 
twelve potential organisations, which were reduced to four case studies at the end of a process of elimination. Over a 
two month period following initial contact and preliminary interviews with a point-of-contact in each research site, 
four sites ruled themselves out of participating in the research, due to their inability to commit to the time required 
for the interviewing process; however, the researcher ruled out the possibility of continuing research in four other 
sites, due to concerns about future access to interviewees and the openness to questioning and willingness to share 
documentary evidence on the part of the point-of-contact.  Notwithstanding this, throughout this same two month 
time period, two of the remaining four cases had progressed considerably in such a short timeframe, where openness 
to share information and willingness to make personnel available for interview was a key feature of their attitude 
and willingness to participate in the research.  Therefore, to maintain good quality research design, the selection of 
the four cases was driven by the ‘appropriateness’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990) of each research site, 
in that they demonstrated a fit to both the purpose of the research and the phenomenon of inquiry.  The four 
organisations we studied are as follows: SerCom Solutions, an Irish owned organisation specialising in Supply 
Chain Management Services, Banta Global Turnkey (BGT) a global organisation involved in a similar business to 
SerCom, the Irish Health Services (now the Health Service Executive), and An Post, the state-owned entity in 
charge of delivering postal services in Ireland.  During the selection process, an initial perception of each ERP 
project and its outcomes was achieved, as presented in Table 2.  All in all, we have to consider that all organisations 
began their ERP projects around 2000 and this makes them early adopters of the technology in the terms proposed 
by Brown and Vessey (2003). 
It should be noted, as is common in collective case studies (Stake, 2000 p.437), that very little was in fact known 
about each of the cases selected in advance, with regard to any common characteristics the cases may possess.  In 
fact, the instrumental qualities of each of these four cases may have proven similar or dissimilar at the time of 
selection, although this was not fully known by the researchers.  In fact Miles and Huberman (1994, p.25) have 
commented that “multiple cases offer the researcher an even deeper understanding of processes and outcomes of 
cases, the chance to test (not just develop) hypothesis, and a good picture of locally grounded causality”.  In 
retrospect, this collection of cases has proven extremely beneficial, due to the fact that understanding them has led to 
(1) a better overall understanding of the ‘desired’ and ‘actual’ outcomes of their investment and, (2) an in-depth 
understanding of their respective preparedness to undertake such an initiative regarding the presence or absence of 
certain CSFs for ERP implementation. Table 2 illustrates the key differences between the cases, as well as their 
inherent cohesion as a sample of four organisations having undertaken and completed ERP projects in the last few 
years. 
Data Collection and Data Analysis 
For the purposes of this study both project documentation and interviews were the primary sources of empirical 
data.  Documentation analysis was exploited as much as was possible, and for each case the documentation provided 
specific details to corroborate, and in some instances clarify, evidence collected through interviews.  A total of 84 
hours of interviews was conducted over a two year period for this study (2004-2006), as illustrated in Table 3.   
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Table 2: Initial Perceptions of Cases Selected for the Research Study 
 SerCom BGT HSE An Post 
Sector Private Private Public Public 
ERP Package SAP R/3 JDE World SAP R/3 JDE OneWorld 
ERP Footprint Core Operations 
(Manufacturing and 
Logistics) 
Core Operations 
(Supply Chain 
Manufacturing and 
Finance) 
HR / Payroll Finance 
ERP System Type Value Chain 
Operations 
Value Chain 
Operations 
Support Operations Support Operations 
Project Type Business Change IT IT Business Change 
Enterprise-Wide 
View 
Yes No No Yes 
Project Initiation / 
completion 
2000 / 2002 1995 / on-going 
process 
improvement 
1997 / 2005 1997 / on-going 
process 
improvement 
Project Outcome Very Successful Near Failure Suspended Partly Successful 
Point-of-Contact 
Comment 
“The project 
required an 
enormous effort 
from everyone but it 
was successful” 
“I could tell you all 
the things not to do.  
We have not done 
well with our 
implementation” 
“This project is not 
going well.  It will 
face huge issues 
when rolled-out 
nationally” 
“We have learned 
some hard lessons 
but that’s the 
nature of these 
projects” 
Table 3: Breakdown of Interviews by Case 
Organisation Number of Informants
1
 Hours of Interview 
SerCom 11 22 
BGT 9 22 
HSE 9 23 
An Post 6 17 
 
All interviews were conducted on site, varying from a one to a three hour duration. A large percentage of 
interviewees were interviewed two, and in some cases, three times.  All interviews were audio-taped for subsequent 
transcription and for verification of accurate interpretation.  Following the first round of interviews, transcripts were 
sent to the informants for review and verification of the content.  During the focused interviews ambiguities and 
discrepancies were clarified and information from the first round of interviewing was confirmed.  Furthermore, the 
repeat rounds of focused interviews ensured that a certain flow of questioning was followed based on the analysis 
conducted on the earlier interviews, both in that same case and across the other cases.  As we conducted semi-
structured interviews, we provide a sample of first round interview topics from our interview guide (see Appendix 
A). It is noteworthy that our informants were the remaining key decision-makers and most knowledgeable persons in 
each site, in relation to the decisions made during the enterprise-wide ERP project; some key organisational 
personnel involved in the projects having already left. 
In the within-case analysis, rich constructed narratives were developed to characterise each ERP project. These were 
used in the cross-case analysis to compare cases systematically, illustrating the similarities and differences between 
the cases. These constructed narratives provided a common frame of reference in order to better recognise, 
understand and ultimately structure the stories that informants retrospectively recalled about their organisation’s 
ERP project implementation.  Furthermore, the informants’ retrospective accounts were used to rigorously detect the 
                                                           
1
 Throughout the two year period the movement of personnel to different organisational roles and to other 
organisations was both expected and observed. 
Organization Theory, Strategy and IS 
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presence or absence of CSFs for ERP implementation in their respective projects.  In fact, Brown (2000, p.46) 
described narratives as “the most useful way to understand sense-making”.  Furthermore, these retrospective 
accounts of informants were triangulated with available documentation to ensure that the ‘plot’ (Abbott, 1992) of 
each case was reported correctly.  As part of the data reduction process and in an effort to build a logical chain of 
evidence for each case, a series of Explanatory Effects Matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1994) were used during both 
within-case and cross-case analysis.  For the purposes of clarity and readability in this paper, Table 4 and Table 5 
illustrate some of the final outputs of the iterative case analysis process. 
A Comparative Analysis of the Cases Studied 
Based on the within-case and cross-case analysis we conducted (reported in detail in other publications by the 
authors), it was observed that the awareness and preparedness around the CSFs for ERP implementation within 
BGT, the Health Services, and An Post were inadequate for undertaking such a Transformation investment as an 
ERP project. On the other hand, SerCom’s decision-makers displayed a greater awareness and preparedness around 
the CSFs for ERP implementation within their ERP project initiative and as a result can be characterised as being 
mindful (Swanson & Ramiller, 2004) in their approach to their ERP project.  Against this backdrop, which serves to 
characterise the process followed by the organisational personnel involved in each of the four projects, the CSFs for 
ERP implementation and their presence or absence in the preparations of each organisation are discussed in the next 
section. Our analysis of the absence or presence of these CSFs is then benchmarked against the expectations 
managers had of their ERP projects, initially. Based on these observations, we then derive a set of CSFs which are 
particularly important for managers in ensuring that the most important and difficult aspects of their ERP projects, 
those that relate to the transformational nature of these projects, are handled successfully. 
CSFs for ERP Implementation 
In preamble to this discussion, our observations in the four cases lead to the conclusion that certain decisions taken 
at the outset of the project based on the awareness and preparedness of managerial decision-makers around the CSFs 
for ERP implementation, can: (1) affect the impact of the project/investment on the organisation, (2) account for the 
problems that an organisation experiences throughout the execution phase of the project implementation, and (3)  
impact on the desired outcomes of the project. These conclusions are supported by the evidence presented in Table 
4, which illustrates each of the organisation’s experiences around the CSFs for ERP implementation, based on a 
sample of the retrospective accounts of informants within each of the cases.  
The appreciation within SerCom to understand the business implications of the project from the outset and embrace 
an enterprise-wide view for the project initiative was extremely high.  For example, SerCom took a strategic view 
that their business model was changing and acted mindfully (Swanson & Ramiller, 2004) with regard to prioritising 
critical aspects of the business and ensuring that these business operations were represented on the ERP system from 
the outset.  Therefore, SerCom management considered the impact of the ERP package on the entire organisation 
and isolated critical functional areas.  From the outset, the awareness of SerCom management dictated that no 
attempt be made to represent all functional areas on the system at once, only those earmarked as critically important, 
in view of future business changes needed.  As a result, this ensured that the scope of the project was more 
manageable and the project could be completed in a shorter timeframe.  Therefore, as a result of the management’s 
awareness to isolate and prioritise business requirements, SerCom achieved their objectives within a short timeframe 
and 100% of the functionality required was delivered, using a small number of highly skilled and knowledgeable 
business and IT personnel.   
An Post demonstrated a high level of awareness for the project initially, however, their preparation was inadequate 
at the outset and as a result they faced a number of setbacks throughout the lifecycle of the project.  Indeed, 
borrowing the terminology of Patton (1990), An Post can be characterised as a deviant case, in that managers 
displayed a high awareness of what was involved, but this awareness translated into less than adequate preparations 
being made for the project.  This observation suggests that while decision-makers within An Post were aware of 
what was needed, in theory, for their ERP initiative, they did not fully appreciate the importance and complexities of 
the implementation process, in practice, when making preparations for the project.  In other words, they failed to 
apply the means that their ambitious aims required. Therefore, while the ERP project was considered the largest ever 
business process project within An Post it was not approached as a ‘priority one’ concern by all business units.  
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Table 4 Informants’ Retrospective Accounts of CSFs for ERP Implementation 
CSF SerCom BGT HSE An Post 
CSF  Existence of Actual 
Strategic Business Need 
informing Specific 
Project Goals and 
Objectives 
P There was an 
understanding that the 
business model was 
changing and a number of 
strategic business goals 
were set against the project 
A There was very little 
appreciation  that the 
nature of the business 
was changing and no 
real business objectives 
were set for the project 
A Very little consideration 
was given to the business 
need for the project and no 
real strategic business 
objectives were associated 
with the project 
P Managers anticipated a 
changing competitive 
business environment 
and a number of strategic 
business objectives were 
assigned to the project 
CSF Top Management 
Commitment and 
Support 
P The project was the 
priority one concern of the 
CEO who was also the 
chairperson of the steering 
committee 
A The ERP project was 
never given ‘priority’ 
and there was a lack of 
conviction at top levels 
to drive the project 
A There was very little 
executive sponsorship 
throughout the Health 
Service 
A The project was the 
largest ever business 
process project but was 
not approached as a 
priority by all units 
CSF Prioritised Business 
Requirements and 
Required System 
Functionality 
PThe requirements of the 
business were prioritised 
and consensus was reached 
as to the critical elements 
in each area in addressing 
the business needs.  This 
guided the module 
selection / implementation 
and 100% of what was 
required was delivered 
A A poorly defined set 
of business requirements 
was developed at the 
outset, providing a 
‘wish-list’ as opposed to 
critical requirements. As 
a result, the ERP did not 
have the capabilities to 
meet all business 
requirements 
A The project was a 
replacement of ‘as-is’ 
business processes as per 
legacy systems. It led to 
‘local interpretations’ of 
how to automate business 
processes.  There was a 
lack of even the most basic 
consensus in relation to the 
business value of the ERP 
A During the analysis 
process, not all personnel 
performing the business 
process activities were 
involved. Requirements 
were only established as 
‘high level overviews’.  
This led to functionality 
gaps and, ultimately, 
undelivered functionality 
CSF Allocation of Best 
Internal Business 
Personnel 
P There was active 
involvement of key 
personnel in the project 
and all project team 
members were full-time on 
the project 
A Where business 
personnel were involved 
on the project, it was still 
driven by IT, and the IT 
personnel were telling 
the business personnel 
what to do 
A Insufficient commitment 
of internal human 
resources to the project 
A Most internal project 
team members had little 
experience of project 
work and were on the 
team on a contractual 
basis, or as recently 
appointed graduates 
CSF Effective 
Communication 
P Communication from the 
top ensured the project was 
a priority throughout the 
organisation 
A No central steering 
group existed governing 
the project which led to 
poor organisational 
communication and 
managerial support 
A The attitude to the 
project was negative and  
support for change and 
criticality of adoption were 
not communicated from 
the top down 
A There was a lack of a 
formal communication 
structure to promote 
dialogue between 
members of the project 
team 
CSF Definitive Project 
Scope 
 
P A complete blue-print 
was developed with 
prioritised business 
functions and the scope 
was defined accordingly 
A Poorly defined scope 
and automated site 
specific ‘as-is’ processes 
to varying degrees 
A There was no real focus 
for the project; therefore, 
the scope of the project 
was subject to scope creep 
over time 
A The detail behind each 
system’s function was 
not adequately 
documented in support 
of the business 
CSF Accurate Project 
Timeframe and Costing 
P The project was 
completed within a short 
timeframe and within 
budget 
A The project was not 
fully completed within 
the timeframe and the 
true accumulated cost of 
selecting, implementing, 
supporting and 
modifying the ERP 
package over the past 
decade was unknown 
A The project was not fully 
completed and was 
suspended.  Also, the 
controversial PPARS 
project is estimated to have 
cost anything between 
€150 and €500 million, 
where original estimates of 
costs were set at €8.8 m. 
A The project was not 
completed with the 
timeframe and the true 
accumulated cost of 
selecting, implementing, 
supporting and 
modifying the ERP 
package was unknown 
CSF Required 
Organisational Buy-In 
and Project Ownership 
P A level of commitment 
existed to do whatever it 
took and to embrace 
change to ensure the future 
growth of the business. 
Leading members of each 
functional area were 
involved, under the 
guidance of a strong 
project manager 
A Getting buy-in from 
business personnel was 
difficult because BGT 
employees did not want 
to take part in a project 
that was perceived as 
extra work and respon-
sibility.  Furthermore, 
some business personnel 
were slow to buy into the 
project and take owner-
ship because it was seen 
as an IT initiative 
A There was a resistance to 
business change in a civil 
service culture and this did 
not facilitate getting things 
done nationally in a unified 
and standardised way.  
Ultimately, entities within 
the Health Service enjoyed 
huge autonomy in how 
they operated 
A There was resistance 
to business change due 
to the civil service 
culture. Changing 
people’s mindset was 
difficult because of the 
autonomy enjoyed by the 
various units. Many 
issues arose due to 
personnel not taking 
ownership of the ERP, or 
not even understanding 
the processes 
Actual Project Outcome Transformation Renewal Renewal Renewal 
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For example, An Post was aware of the importance of a steering committee for the project, but they failed to ensure 
that the steering committee remained for the full duration of the ERP project.  Furthermore, An Post understood the 
importance of documenting requirements throughout the project, but preparations were not made to ensure that this 
documentation of requirements was produced throughout phase 1 of the project.  As a result of this, when end-users 
expressed dissatisfaction with the functionality of the ERP package in meeting their requirements, post ‘go-live’, 
there was no requirements documentation available to support the emergence of an easy solution to this problem.  
Finally, the majority of the project team (business personnel especially) had little or no experience of enterprise-
wide projects and were assigned on a contractual basis, or were recently appointed graduates specifically employed 
by An Post for this project (therefore not being able to contribute in any meaningful way).  These examples of a lack 
of preparedness left An Post with less than desirable project outcomes where the project failed to deliver real 
business value and meet the business objectives set for the project, resulting in the business never properly taking 
ownership of the project.       
Both BGT and the Health Services share a number of common characteristics in terms of their experiences with 
their ERP project initiatives. Both organisations found themselves undertaking an IT initiative from the outset, 
where the required level of business support simply was not there.  Therefore, the priority of the project was not set 
at a high enough level within the business community.  Furthermore, the project was never given a set of clear and 
consistent (universally understood) strategic business objectives as a platform to guide decision making during the 
project (although it is clear from our interviews that major changes in the environments of both organisations were 
requiring major changes to the business model) and the criticality of adoption was not communicated from the top 
level.  In both BGT and the Health Services the active involvement of business personnel on the project was a cause 
of serious problems.  It was a feature of both organisations that personnel were not seconded onto the project team 
full-time and as a result their commitment to the project was reduced as they were also performing their daily roles 
in parallel. Furthermore, no real formal team structure was put in place and the roles and responsibilities of project 
team members were poorly defined, leading to a lack of ownership for the project by team members.  We claim that 
in both sites, this lack of ownership led to a less than successful project outcome.  However, a failure to allocate 
sufficient business resources to the ERP project, in both these cases, also compounded the impact of the problem of 
standardisation, in that, the business personnel were not adequately skilled to perform their roles on the project team, 
in terms of understanding the business and driving change to introduce standardisations at an organisational level (ie 
across sites). Thus, it is obvious that a lack of preparedness for such a key issue as standardising to an enterprise-
wide business process infrastructure from the outset, led to an extended project timeframe, with an associated 
escalation in costs, and a poor fit between the software and the business, in both BGT and the Health Services.  As a 
result, no real long-term business value-added was realised from undertaking the ERP project in these two cases.   
Finally, within BGT, the Health Services and An Post, the rationale for adopting their initial approach to the 
implementation of the ERP package hinged on the organisational structure and the mindset of those involved in the 
project at the time of initiation.  Therefore, unlike SerCom, these three organisations demonstrated a lack of 
appreciation of what an enterprise-wide view of the organisation entails, for example in terms of business process 
infrastructure, where very little attention was attributed to standardising processes to drive out efficiencies in the 
business.  Therefore, the CSFs for ERP implementation were not fully understood within these three cases, 
especially when pursuing a Transformation investment.   
Benchmarking the Outcomes of the Projects against Managers’ Expectations 
When organisations are evaluating their investments in ERP packages they can move beyond the ‘business case’ of 
analysing costs and benefits by ensuring that the CSFs for ERP implementation are understood and exist in their 
Transformation project endeavour.  Based on our observations in three of the cases studied (excluding SerCom), 
where these CSFs were absent in their ERP project implementations, their investment became Renewal.  Analysing 
the nature of the ERP investments within the four organisations studied and highlighting the discrepancies between 
what was achieved in reality and what was actually expected when undertaking the project at the outset provides a 
clear illustration of the mismatch between the theory and practice with regard to investing in ERP packages.  As an 
example, Table 5 highlights the differences between the ‘desired’ (expectations at the outset of the project) and 
‘actual’ outcome of the respective ERP project investments.  It can also be noted that in two of the cases (BGT and 
An Post) additional “corrective” project initiatives (Process Improvement investments) were undertaken to provide 
the expected value-added of the initial ERP investment. 
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Table 5: Categorising the ‘Desired’ and ‘Actual’ ERP Project Outcomes 
Organisation Desired Project 
Outcome 
Actual Project 
Outcome 
Initiatives to Adjust Actual 
Project Outcome 
SerCom Transformation Transformation  
BGT Transformation Renewal Business Process Improvement 
initiatives in SCM and Finance 
HSE Transformation Renewal Project suspended 
An Post Transformation Renewal Process Improvement exercises to 
retrofit the implemented ERP 
system 
 
From the outset SerCom viewed their ERP project as an enterprise-wide initiative and the supporting investment 
was viewed as Transformation.  The driver for the project was very much a carbon copy of that described by Ross & 
Beath (2002) for Transformation investments ‘a core infrastructure that is inadequate for desired business model’.  
Furthermore, the entire organisation took ownership of the project investment, embracing a ‘long-term growth’ 
strategic objective and a ‘shared infrastructure’ technological scope.  However, when compared to the ERP project 
undertaken by BGT, while it was also initially considered a Transformation investment in terms of group-wide 
focus, both the US and European operations commenced separate Renewal investments.  Both of these initiatives 
were driven by the issue of Y2K compliance and were owned by IT.  The strategic objective characterising these 
investments was short-term focused, where the technological scope was limited to providing a separate shared 
infrastructure for both operations.  However, over time BGT invested in a series of Business Process Improvements 
(Finance BPI and SCM BPI) from a group perspective throughout BGT.  These Process Improvement investments 
were viewed as the key to bringing BGT closer to the ideal of a Transformation investment.  Therefore, this new 
investment portfolio allowed BGT to fulfil their strategic objective of ‘long-term growth’ and providing a ‘shared 
infrastructure’ across the entire group. 
An Post attempted a Transformation investment at the outset but it was effectively a Renewal characterised by a 
series of Process Improvement investments throughout the project although they were not distinctly identified as 
such.  The project ultimately delivered cost reductions in certain areas of the An Post operation and raised the 
quality of IT service, in the majority of cases moving from a manual to automated solution within the business units 
involved.  However, limited business process change was a feature of the project, where existing ‘as-is’ processes 
were simply automated, and it was very much driven by external consultants and internal IT, with poor business 
resource and expertise provided by the business units for the project.  While the strategic objective was ‘short-term 
profitability’, the technological scope provided ‘shared infrastructure’ but on a somewhat limited enterprise-wide 
view, throughout An Post.  In comparison the ERP project within the HSE may have been politically described as a 
Transformation investment (as its label Personnel, Payroll and Related Systems or PPARS suggests), but in reality, 
at the outset, the project was supported as a Renewal investment type (short-term strategic objective, introducing a 
limited shared infrastructure), in that it was simply replacing existing HR/Payroll systems in a small number of 
health agencies. The PPARS project did not embrace an enterprise-wide perspective or set about to introduce 
process standardisation across the Health Service in these functional areas.  Although advised by a number of 
external consulting groups to address the state of the project before proceeding in phase 2, the Health Service 
continually attempted to undertake a Transformation investment without addressing these issues.  It is possible that 
these issues may have been addressed if the Health Service leveraged a number of distinct Process Improvement 
investments, as was identified in BGT and in An Post to a lesser extent.  Inevitably this attempted Transformation 
investment failed and the project did not achieve enterprise-wide coverage (and was in fact suspended). 
Conclusion: Deriving CSFs for Transformation Investments  
We conclude this section by leveraging the discussion presented in the previous sub-sections to derive a set of five 
macro-CSFs which require particular attention from managers in order to ensure that investments in ERP packages 
produce outcomes which are in-line with those desired by an organisation at the outset of a project.  These five CSFs 
for Transformation investments are described below. 
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CSF 1: Define a strategic business need and Communicate the need for change 
This ensures that the business impacts of the proposed business change programme are documented and the project 
is not simply considered an IT initiative.  Evidence supports the fact that a lack of a real business objective at the 
outset of the project left BGT and the Health Services in a situation where the outcome of the project was less than 
successful in terms of delivering the required ERP package functionality. In addition, it failed to contribute to 
developing the future business capability these organisations required in the future. Therefore, the existence of an 
actual strategic business need and the ability to prioritise critical business process areas, based on this need, is 
critical to ensuring that a project will produce the desired successful outcome in terms of business value and 
required package functionality. 
CSF 2: Communicate a visible ‘priority one’ project status and Manage expectations from the top 
This ensures that under the governance of senior management, the project is understood by all to support the future 
strategic business direction. As is evident from the cases studied here, many organisations struggle with the 
necessarily large commitment required by a Transformation investment.  In fact, SerCom was the only organisation 
to embrace this notion of ensuring that responsibility for the Transformation investment rested with those 
stakeholders who understood the business and could drive through the necessary process changes.  All of the other 
organisations faced problems with this ideal vision of responsibility for the investment and ultimately the project.  
For example, where SerCom had the most senior and highly skilled business personnel in positions of responsibility 
on the project, both An Post and the Health Services had inexperienced business personnel taking responsibility, 
when these business personnel were in fact made available (in fact consultants took a lot of the responsibility in 
these two project initiatives), while BGT had IT personnel predominantly dictate the project and take responsibility.         
CSF 3: Prioritise the critical functional areas of the business and Define ‘must-have’ business requirements 
This ensures that the ERP package functionality will be aligned to meet the critical requirements of the business.  As 
evidenced within the cases performing an ‘as-is’ and ‘to-be’ analysis of the critical business processes ensures that 
the organisation will achieve the desired project outcomes associated with implementing the ERP package in support 
of the future direction of the business.  As an example, BGT, the Health Services and An Post implemented the ERP 
package on a site by site basis, embracing ‘as-is’ site specific business processes.  This approach was as a direct 
result of their lack of preparation at the outset of the project where a very limited attempt was made to analyse 
existing business processes in an effort to prioritise requirements and introduce process improvements wherever 
possible across the entire organisation.  By contrast, this prioritisation of requirements and business process 
improvement was a feature of the SerCom approach from the outset.   
CSF 4: Allocate the best internal business resources to the project team full-time 
This ensures that the critical functional areas are appropriately represented when business requirements are defined.  
As evidenced within the four cases this CSF had the most significant impact on all of the ERP projects.  Evidence 
also supports the fact that managers were reluctant to give up their best business resources full-time to the initiatives.  
For example, within BGT, the Health Services and An Post, a reluctance to provide the best internal business 
resources to their respective projects, which it is argued was as a direct result of a lack of top management 
commitment and support to the project from the outset, led to an immature understanding of existing business 
processes on the one hand and new business process transactions on the other hand. The addition of the new 
technological environment and its additional uncertainties copper-fastened the delivery of poor project outcomes in 
terms of required ERP package functionality. 
CSF 5: Define a narrow project scope to meet requirements within a short timeframe and within budget 
This ensures that the project is completed within a short timeframe and key functional areas have the required 
package functionality delivered quickly in support of their ‘must-have’ business requirements.  Evidence supports 
the fact that in three of the cases there was a lack of a coherent implementation methodology, emphasising clear and 
consistent project scope focusing on critical aspects of the business, appropriate documentation of requirements to 
be addressed, and clearly defined lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability, from the outset of their 
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projects.  As a result, this left BGT, the Health Services, and An Post in a situation where the outcome of the project 
was not delivered on time and within budget.  However, SerCom achieved their desired project outcome, where an 
accurate project costing and an accurate project timeframe were characteristics of their efforts. 
The presence of these actionable CSFs is the first step in improving the likelihood that a Transformation investment 
in ERP produces the actual outcomes in-line with the outcomes desired at the outset of the project.   
Concluding Remarks, Implications and Further Research 
The outputs of this research study contribute to our understanding of ERP project outcomes, in terms of the concept 
of Transformation investments as defined by Ross and Beath (2002), and lead to a causal model of the CSFs for 
ERP implementation that must be present to ensure that investments in ERP packages have a greater likelihood of 
producing Transformation investment project outcomes.  Furthermore, this research paper make a definitive attempt 
to raise managers’ awareness of the need for their organisations to undertake self-assessment exercises to improve 
their preparations for ERP project implementations. The implications for research and practice are now discussed.   
This study offers several implications for researchers.  The first outcome consists of a definitive characterisation of 
ERP project outcomes in terms of the Ross and Beath (2002) framework. Based on our observations, we propose to 
define Transformation investment project outcomes as follows: where the organisation has gained the flexibility to 
react more efficiently to changing business requirements or enter new business areas to meet customer needs.  The 
organisation’s efficiency is supported and enabled by the existence of a robust business process infrastructure 
enabled by the ERP system and an enterprise-wide view of data.  Furthermore, we distinguish a Renewal investment 
project outcome as follows: where the organisation has modeled current business processes on the ERP system 
providing an adequate infrastructure to meet current customer needs, but is unable to operate efficiently to meet 
changing demands; while an enterprise-wide view of data may also not exist.  Such a project outcome may require 
additional investment to retrofit the implemented ERP system in the future. We believe these two definitions are an 
apt characterisation of the gap that often arises between what managers try to obtain and what they end up obtaining 
after their ERP implementations, bearing in mind that the resulting infrastructure is binding for these organisations 
(Markus and Tanis, 2000).        
Secondly, the research findings contribute to theory development in IS by adding to our current understanding of 
investing in ERP packages and illustrating the usefulness of the CSF approach to evaluating such investments.  Our 
paper proposes a method for evaluating investments in ERP packages moving away from the business case, which 
focuses narrowly on costs and benefits, towards assessing the presence or absence of CSFs for ERP implementation 
at the outset of a project.  An organisation’s inability to evaluate investments in ERP packages seems to be a key 
characteristic of their mindlessness (Swanson & Ramiller, 2004). Thus, if managerial decision-makers assessed their 
awareness of the CSFs for Transformation investments then their organisation may become more mindful (Swanson 
& Ramiller, 2004) of their rationales for investing in ERP packages, and more importantly could be better prepared 
for the project implementation while achieving the actual outcomes expected from the project.  This research 
provides managers with a CSF-based recipe for achieving Transformation investment outcomes (Figure 1) which 
will also increase the perceived usefulness of CSFs to managers in general. Our causal model illustrated in Figure 1 
is constructed around the five CSFs identified as the most pertinent in this study and shows their interrelatedness, 
such that the absence of one of these CSFs does not have a well-defined isolated impact on the outcomes of an ERP 
project implementation, but will in fact compound implementation problems further, such that, in the end, 
Transformation investments produce Renewal investment outcomes.         
While these CSFs appear generic in as of themselves, based on our research outputs it is the relationships between 
them and their combined impact which organisations who are striving to produce outcomes in-line with those 
expected from a Transformation investment must understand and focus upon. We argue that the causal sequence of 
the CSFs, with some CSFs being clear antecedents of the others, does represent the order in which the CSFs should 
be addressed.  For example, while a strategic business need has to be defined upfront, the need for change must also 
be communicated throughout the organisation if a true Transformation investment is the desired outcome.  
Communicating this need for change from the outset of the project will help to manage the expectations of 
organisational personnel and also enforce the ‘priority one’ status of the project.  A well defined strategic business 
need and the communication of the ‘priority one’ project status will, in turn, facilitate the prioritisation of the critical 
functional areas of the business to be supported by the implemented ERP system.  Using these critical functional 
areas, the best internal business resources can then be allocated to the project team on a full-time basis and these 
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business resources will define the ‘must have’ business requirements for their respective areas.  It is the definition of 
these ‘must have’ business requirements for the critical functional areas that facilitates defining a narrow project 
scope to meet requirements within a short timeframe and within budget.  Also, expectations managed from the top 
will support efforts to allocate the best internal business resources in order to define a narrow project scope, as there 
is an accurate appreciation amongst organisational personnel as to what the project involves and what is being 
impacted by the Transformation investment.              
 
Figure 1: A CSF-based Recipe to achieve Transformation Investment Outcomes 
Thus, this study has clear implications for practice, based on the understanding embedded in Figure 1: an 
organisation taking the time to undertake a self-assessment exercise on the presence or absence of CSFs, presented 
in Figure 1, will inevitably improve their preparations for the project implementation, as their level of awareness 
will be raised as to the importance of previously unknown factors (if absent) in their organisational context.  This 
will lead to a greater understanding of how desired outcomes can be achieved, not by simply trying to follow cook 
book recipes based on laundry lists of CSFs, but by realising from the very beginning, how and why  these five 
CSFs matter. In addition, this will provide a greater measure of the risk of undertaking such projects 
(Transformation investments) and the risk of failing to achieve, at least in part, some of their desired outcomes. 
Whilst this study has contributed to our understanding of investing in ERP packages, it has its limitations and 
requires further investigations. While the CSFs for Transformation investments are encouraging and useful in 
practice, these findings cannot be generalised to all organisations undertaking ERP projects. Rather, they reflect the 
early adopters status of our case studies (Brown and Vessey, 2003) as illustrated by the need to do it again and do it 
right the second time scenario in three of our four cases; leading to the extreme time duration of their ERP projects.  
Therefore, the presence or absence of CSFs for ERP implementation should be examined in additional cases of ERP 
implementations and as a result it should become possible to provide managers with actionable scenarios which they 
can use as blueprints for their EPR projects, covering a wide range of organisational contexts and settings.   
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Appendix A: A Selection of First Round Interview topics from our interview guide 
 
1. A certain problem existed for which a solution was required.  How was the problem and the subsequent solution 
identified? 
2. What was the business vision for the ERP project? 
3. What were the technological (systems), organisational (process) and financial inefficiencies constraining the 
organisation, balanced against current and future business needs? 
4. What type of systems and applications existed on the legacy systems?  In what way were these applications 
deficient?  What business requirements did these applications fulfil?   
5. What amount of organisational change was envisaged? 
6. What approach to investment evaluation/justification was undertaken? 
7. What were the expected benefits from the introduction of the ERP?  
8. In light of the fact that a decision was made to implement an ERP (problem identification), how was the 
package evaluation and selection process conducted?   
9. In what way did any of the decisions made at this ‘problem identification’ stage affect the project’s 
implementation? 
10. What were the expected benefits of the project? 
11. How were expectations managed? 
12. What type of benefits/expectations were realised from implementation? 
13. What factors were critical to the successful implementation of the ERP project? 
14. In what way were these factors critical to the ERP project implementation?   
15. Why were these factors critical to the ERP project implementation?   
16. In having implemented an ERP system, what would you do differently? 
